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FEDERAL WDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
CARL TOBIAS*

Professor Tobias assesses federal judicial selection for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for North
Carolina. His Essay ascertains that four of fifteen active
judgeships that Congress has authorized for the court have
remained vacant over a considerable period and that a seat
designated for North Carolina has been unfilled for seven years.
He finds that these judicial vacancies may affect the appellate
justice which the Fourth Circuit delivers and that North Carolina
deserves.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal judicial selection in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has proven highly controversial over the last
decade. The appointment of appellate judges to this court has
provoked charges and countercharges among members of the United
States Senate who represent states located in the Fourth Circuit.
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), for example, blocked Senate
consideration of two African-Americans, United States District Judge
James A. Beaty, Jr., and North Carolina Court of Appeals Chief
Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., whom President Bill Clinton nominated. 1
Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) may prevent the Senate from
processing the nomination of United States District Judge Terrence
Boyle, whose name President George W. Bush submitted in May
2001 at the apparent behest of Senator Helms.2 The court also has a
second "North Carolina" seat that is open and for which the
President has not proposed anyone. On July 20, 2001, Judge Roger
Gregory became the first African-American member of the Fourth
Circuit, but the Senate confirmed him only after President Clinton
accorded Gregory a recess appointment and Virginia's Republican
Senators suggested President Bush nominate Gregory.3 Moreover,
1. See, e.g., David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over
a Federal Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 2001, at A13; John Monk, Hatch Raps N. C.
4th Circuit Candidate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 1996, at 2B; David G. Savage,
Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the Senate, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2001, at A12.
2. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13,
2002, at 1; John Wagner, Panel Would Suggest Nominees, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 19, 2002, at B5.
3. Senator George Allen stated that Gregory had an "inspirational story" and a
"proper judicial philosophy," while Senator John Warner characterized Gregory's
confirmation as an "historic moment." See Alison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3 Judges,
Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A16; see also Brooke A.
Masters, Battle Brewing Over 4th Circuit Nominees, WASH. POST, May 5, 2001, at A6
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Maryland's Democratic Senators stopped the nomination of Peter
Keisler to the appellate court because President Bush had not
consulted them and because the candidate never practiced law in
Maryland.4
Although Congress has authorized fifteen active judgeships for
the Fourth Circuit, the tribunal presently experiences four judicial
vacancies, which means that the Sixth Circuit is the only appeals court
that now has a higher percentage of empty seats.5 The Fourth
Circuit's Chief Judge, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., has testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee that the appellate court operates
efficaciously without its complete judicial complement.6 The tribunal,
however, affords oral arguments in thirty percent of the appeals
terminated on the merits and publishes opinions in only eleven
percent.7 The first statistic ties for the smallest and the second is the
lowest of the twelve regional circuits; these data raise significant
questions about the appellate justice that the appeals court delivers.
Indeed, one Fourth Circuit position authorized by Congress during
1990 was not occupied until the Senate confirmed Gregory in 2001,
while a North Carolina seat on the court has remained unfilled for
seven years.8
All of the above propositions suggest that federal judicial
selection for the Fourth Circuit is increasingly controversial,
contentious, and important, and it warrants assessment. This Essay
undertakes such an effort.
First, it evaluates the historical
background of the problems that have accompanied appointments to
the tribunal. The Essay then analyzes possible solutions to these
(affording background of Gregory's confirmation).
4. See generally Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 2001, at A24 (reporting that Peter Keisler, an expected nominee, was not nominated
because of a dispute with Democratic Senators); David Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal
Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al (reporting that Keisler, the expected nominee for
a Maryland seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, was not
included in President Bush's nominations).
5. VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (July 30, 2002), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm {last visited Aug. 2, 2002) (on file
\vi th the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter VACANCIES].
6. Most relevant to the issues that I consider in this Essay is Conserving Judicial
Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin.
Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary].
7. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, 22 tbls.2-6 to 2-7 (1998).
8. See VACANCIES, supra note 5; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing Gregory's appointment).
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problems, emphasizing approaches each political branch may institute
that would remedy or ameliorate the complications that will attend
the future choices of Fourth Circuit judges generally and from North
Carolina specifically.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Introduction
An examination of the origins and growth of the phenomena that
have made Fourth Circuit judicial selection controversial can inform
comprehension of the Fourth Circuit and of the problems that have
accompanied the court's appointments.
Because pertinent
developments in this court are inextricably intertwined with events
across the country, consultation of national considerations also yields
instructive perspectives on the Fourth Circuit. For example, the
continuing dispute in North Carolina resembles an ongoing Michigan
controversy. Two Clinton nominees from Michigan never received
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, and Democratic Senators have
stymied consideration of four Bush nominees who live in that state.9
Moreover, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have
experienced similarly large numbers of openings at various times
since 1995.10 Republican Senators may have found that the political
views of several Clinton Ninth Circuit nominees were too liberal, just
as Democratic Senators might now deem certain Bush Fourth and
Sixth Circuit nominees overly conservative. Thus, although the
Fourth Circuit is not necessarily representative, selection efforts there
have encountered obstacles that closely resemble those manifested in
other courts.

B.

National Developments

Nationwide developments, which have implicated Fourth Circuit
appointments, are subtle and complex, and a relatively
comprehensive assessment can enhance understanding of Fourth
Circuit judicial selection.11 There are two principal constituents to the
9. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading
Heats Up As Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW MEDIA, Aug. 31, 2001,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ0136F2RC
(last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Savage, supra
note 1.
10. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit,
19 REV. LmG. 233, 234 {2000); Groner, supra note 2.
11. For thorough examinations of national developments, see MILLER CTR. COMM'N
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difficulty involving the selection of federal judges. One component is
the persistent vacancies conundrum, which derived from
congressional expansion of federal court jurisdiction and sharp rises
in appeals over the past several decades.12 This dynamic fostered the
appellate judiciary's growth, thus increasing the number and
frequency of vacancies and complicating attempts to fill them. The
second constituent is the current political impasse that resulted in
substantial measure from control of the presidency and the Senate by
opposing political parties since the late 1980s.13 This Essay
emphasizes the second problem because it better explains the
complications accompanying Fourth Circuit selection.14
1. The Persistent Vacancies Conundrum

The permanent vacancies problem can be traced to the nation's
founding and to Article II of the United States Constitution. This
Essay, however, focuses on the conundrum's modern features,
attributed to enlarged federal court jurisdiction and docket growth
that prompted authorization of numerous, new judgeships. These
features increased the number and frequency of the vacancies and the
difficulty of filling them.
ON THE SELECTION OF FED. JUDGES, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING
FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE
SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT]; Gordon
Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions,
14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994). I rely substantially in this Essay on Carl Tobias, Federal
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). Much in
that article remains relevant, although the political parties' circumstances are reversed.
12. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari
and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268-70 (1996).
See generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the
Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11 (assessing these and related ideas).
13. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 528; see also Thomas 0. Sargentich, Report of the
Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens For Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1031, 1033-34 (1999) (recognizing this phenomenon). See generally MORRIS P.
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996) (assessing the phenomenon of divided
government).
14. The persistent vacancies problem deserves less analysis because much delay in
selection is inherent and, thus, resists treatment, political factors contribute less to the
persistent problem than the current impasse, and the vacancies problem has been assessed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Bermant et al., supra note 11 (examining causes of, and proposing
solutions to, persistent judicial vacancies); Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the
Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary-The Problem of Judicial Vacancies
and Its Causes, 42 REC. AsS'N B. CITY N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter The Problem of
Judicial Vacancies] (analyzing the constant problem of judicial vacancies and offering
potential solutions); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76
JUDICATURE 185 (1993) (discussing the state of judicial gridlock inherent in the federal
judicial system and possible solutions).
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The Early History

The Founders expressly provided, and consciously envisioned,
that politics would play a major role in judicial selection.Is The
Appointments Clause in Article II states that the President "shall
nominate, and by and \vith the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint" judges.I6 Numerous Framers contemplated that
Senators would serve as a beneficial check on the President's spirit of
favoritism and would minimize selection of unfit individuals while
functioning as an effective source of stability. I7
Senate members have been actively involved in the process since
the republic's early days because they have an important stake in
influencing, or seeming to affect, selection.Is Complex political
accommodations between the Senate and the President during the
nascent stages have facilitated the regime's smooth operation. 19
Moreover, Senators traditionally have participated in choosing
nominees, especially for the federal district courts. Senators, or
senior elected officials of the President's political party, from the state
in which the judge will sit, typically have suggested individuals whom
the President then has nominated.20
Politics, accordingly, permeate judicial selection. If the President
and Senators differ, they may behave tactically to secure advantage
and to exercise control over nomination and confirmation, even using

15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). For more analysis of this history, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in
Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75
JUDICATURE 68, 69-70 (1991).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution assigns the President and the
Senate much larger roles than the House of Representatives and the courts. "The
President" includes Executive Branch officials, such as attorneys in the White House
Counsel's Office and the Department of Justice, who help the president. "The Senate"
includes the Judiciary Committee, which has primary responsibility for the confirmation
process, and its chair, Senator Patrick Leahy (R-Vt.); the Majority Leader, Senator
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.); and individual Senate members.
17. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 26-29; Tobias, supra note 11, at 530.
18. See HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7
(1972).
19. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 321. For historical analysis of this and related
ideas, see GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 29-34; Melone, supra note 16.
20. Lawrence Walsh, President Dwight Eisenhower's Deputy Attorney General,
found it difficult to confirm nominees opposed by a Senator from that nominee's
respective state. Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary ... Progress and the Road
Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also MILLER REPORT, supra
note 11, at 4 (including Attorney General Robert Kennedy's description of Senate
appointment with President's advice and consent).
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delay for strategic reasons.21 Illustrative of these ideas are Senator
Helms's efforts in blocking consideration of Clinton nominees from
North Carolina and Senator Edwards's apparent reluctance to afford
Chief Judge Boyle a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.22 Tension
involving the President and Senate members will likely be a
permanent fixture, as long as the chamber's advice and consent
remains a prerequisite for appointment.23
In short, the President and Senators have traditionally shared
considerable responsibility for choosing judges in a process that has
been politicized since the nation was created. Nevertheless, large
numbers of openings, which remain vacant for extended periods, only
evolved into a significant difficulty during the 1970s. Indeed, between
the date that Congress adopted the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the last
third of the twentieth century, the total complement of appeals and
district court judgeships only gradually increased to 300; thus, the
rather few openings and their comparative infrequency promoted the
expeditious filling of empty seats, and, therefore, minimized the
problem which eventually materialized.24
b. History Since 1950
Federal court jurisdiction expanded dramatically in the latter half
of the twentieth century.25 Congress adopted numerous new civil
causes of actions and federalized much criminal behavior, prompting
a 300 percent yearly rise in district court cases after the 1950s.26
Lawmakers responded by increasing the number of federal judges to
address docket growth; thus, there are now 844 active appellate and
district judgeships.27
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States
Judicial Conference, in a thorough 1995 study of the federal courts'
21. See CHASE, supra note 18, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 321.
22. See supra note 2; infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
23. There are apparently two avenues "out of that requirement. One requires
constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." Bermant et al., supra
note 11, at 322.
24. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 531; MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
25. See supra note 12.
26. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see, e.g., Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13701-14223 (2000)) (stating purpose as "to control and prevent crime"); Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2000)). See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical
Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (1995) (assessing increased federalization of criminal
behavior).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2000); see also VACANCIES, supra note 5.
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future, prognosticated that mounting dockets would require 2,300
active judges by 2010 and 4,070 by 2020.28 The judiciary will continue
to expand, in part because Congress will likely not restrict civil or
criminal jurisdiction,29 even though enlarging the bench is quite
controversial.30 The Committee also determined that the period for
filling vacancies had grown.31 Between 1980 and 1995, nominations
on average required a year and confirmations three months.32
Moreover, the time period required for both aspects appeared to be
lengthening.33 A Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") analysis found that
vacancy rates from 1970 until 1992 nearly doubled in the federal
district courts and were more than twice as high in the federal
appellate courts, while most delay happened between the time when a
seat became open and nomination.34
The evaluation above shows that politics has been a perennial
feature of the selection process.35 Nevertheless, certain observers of
judicial appointments contend that the system has become
increasingly politicized since the 1960s.36 They assert that this
development originated in the administration of President Richard
Nixon, who promised to reattain "law and order" by naming judicial
conservatives and "strict constructionists,''37 although a more
contemporary strain can be traced to the Senate's rejection of Circuit

28. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range
Planning Committee predicted that 1,370 judgeships would be required by 2000, however
Congress did not authorize those positions, partly for political reasons, as is evidenced by
its failure to pass a comprehensive judgeships bill since 1990.
29. For these and related ideas see Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the
First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 29, 34-37 (1990); Marshall, supra note 26; William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem
for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 273, 297, 325-334 (1996).
30. Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges,
Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (calling for more judges) with Gerald Bard
Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70 (opposing additional judges).
31. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 28, at 102-05; see also infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
32. MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-4.
33. Id.
34. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 323.
35. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
REPORT OF THE
36. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE:
1\VENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988); Roger E.
Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees,
80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997).
37. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 36, at 20; Tobias, supra note 11, at 532.
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Judge Robert Bork whom President Ronald Reagan had nominated
for the Supreme Court in 1987.38

i. The Basic Framework of Modern Judicial Selection
State Senators or the highest-ranking officials of the President's
political party may participate in choosing appeals court nominees;
however, recent Presidents have limited their roles and assumed
greater responsibility.39 Designees must complete three lengthy
questionnaires for the Department of Justice, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and the American Bar Association ("ABA") Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which has assessed candidates'
professional qualifications for a half-century.40 Justice Department
and White House officials first screen, then assess, and finally
interview the potential nominees, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") conducts background investigations and
security checks on the individuals.41
If these reviews prove satisfactory, the President formally
nominates the candidates and submits their names to the Senate.42
Some private entities, including the Free Congress Foundation and
the Alliance for Justice, which monitor judicial selection, generally
evaluate nominees at this juncture, as does the ABA Committee that
participated earlier in the process.43 The Senate, primarily through
the Judiciary Committee, investigates and analyzes the nominees,

38. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 105 (2001); Sargentich, supra note 13, at 1033-34. For
more analysis of Bork's rejection, see STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS
132-33 (1994); MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT
OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT
(1992).
39. The officers often begin the district court process by proposing candidates.
MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14,
at 375. Each specific presidential administration varies these fundamental procedures
somewhat. See, e.g., CHASE, supra note 18, at 6-7; SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LoWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN
3-14 (1997); O'BRIEN, supra note 36, at 49-64.
40. The ABA has received criticism for being overly political and too slow, but it has
performed a valuable service in assessing nominees. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11,
at 5-6, 8, 11. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1988) (analyzing the ABA's
role).
41. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 14, at 375.
42. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; Tobias, supra note 11, at 533.
43. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 217-29; supra note 40; infra notes 91-92
and accompanying text.
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accords the individuals hearings, and votes on them. 44 The names of
persons whom the Committee approves are transmitted to the full
Senate, where the Senate Majority Leader schedules floor votes on
nominees, who must secure a majority for confirmation.45
ii. Nomination and Confirmation

The Miller Commission, a bipartisan group of distinguished
attorneys who studied the selection process and issued a 1996 report,46
determined that the appointments process has changed significantly
from the process in the 1970s and has become increasingly
complicated, factors that are reflected in growing reliance on larger
staff who screen potential nominees.47 These alterations, which the
group ascertained began in the Reagan Administration, have
persisted during later presidencies.48 The Commission found that
practices have changed in three basic ways: (1) more White House
and Justice Department lawyers and resources are committed to
screening possible judicial nominees; (2) extensive interviews with
candidates are now routine; and (3) White House officials participate
more in the process.49 The Commission also described the three
questionnaires completed by nominees for the Justice Department,
the Judiciary Committee, and the ABA as illustrative of the
bureaucratization of the process, and the Commission discovered that
many queries are repetitive or overlap and efforts to complete the
questionnaires are "burdensome."50
The Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar
("City Bar") performed an analysis reaching similar conclusions
fifteen years ago. It detected substantial White House delay in
44. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 63-69; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 14, at 375.
45. See, e.g., MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; Tobias, supra note 11, at 533.
46. The membership of the bi-partisan commission included present and past federal
appellate and district court judges, former White House Counsels who served Republican
and Democratic presidents, prior Justice Department officials, former United States
Senators, a prominent attorney, and a law professor. MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at
2.
47. Id. at4.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 4-5.
50. See id. at 6. Judiciary Committee nominee vetting and hearings have also delayed
selection because the Committee may lack resources for investigations and may have
difficulty scheduling hearings, which the entity does even for non-controversial nominees.
The Senate leadership's inability to schedule prompt floor debates and votes on nominees
whom the Committee has approved may also cause delay. See id. at 5; The Problem of
Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375-76. For more analysis of confirmations, see
Tobias, supra note 11, at 535-36; infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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proposing candidates and an "inevitable lapse of time" in the
nomination process,s1 while selection did not receive high priority at
the FBI inquiry and Judiciary Committee hearing phases, which
required several months.s2 The group also stated that the overcommitted judiciary could expect little relief, unless those
participating in appointments dramatically changed their priorities,
even as it recognized that a sense of greater urgency by all involved
might significantly expedite selection.s3 Another important study
found that executive and legislative branch officials evince insufficient
appreciation of the vacancies problem's critical nature to institute
actions that will facilitate selection.s4
Numerous observers have astutely suggested to those associated
with nominations and confirmations that they must strike the proper
balance between the need for efficiency and for careful nominee
evaluation. For example, the City Bar recommended the elimination
of unnecessary delay and efforts to facilitate selection, but it warned
against "hurried, assembly-line appointments" of people ill-suited to
be federal judges for life-tenured, important positions.ss The
researchers who conducted a 1994 FJC study at the Long Range
Planning Committee's request, similarly cautioned that an expedited
selection process should not be instituted at the expense of a
comprehensive review of the abilities and character of potential
jurists.s6 The National Commission on Judicial Discipline observed
that considered vetting of candidates to guarantee the selection of
only the most well-qualified and honest judges might minimize the
possibility of subsequent judicial misconduct and suggested that FBI
investigations be thorough.57 Most participants, especially the Senate,
now accord nominees even more detailed review, although the proper
amount of scrutiny is controversial and remains unclear.58

51. See The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 376.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 375.
54. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 347.
55. See The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 377.
56. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 347; see also MILLER REPORT, supra note 11,
at 11 (suggesting that the judiciary's quality is much more important than the time which
must be devoted to appointments).
57. See NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 81 (1993).
58. Compare Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 672, 673, 687 {1989) (urging less scrutiny), with Melone, supra note 15, at 69 (urging
greater scrutiny). For more discussion of the proper level of scrutiny see GERHARDT,
supra note 15, at 135-79; Hartley & Holmes, supra note 36.
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It is important, as well, to appreciate that nomination and
confirmation are intertwined, so that the failure of certain
participants to satisfy temporal deadlines can seriously affect others
involved and exacerbate delay.59 For instance, the simultaneous
submission of numerous nominees may postpone completion of FBI
background investigations or ABA qualification ratings which could
correspondingly slow the confirmation process.60

iii. Limited Prospects For Meaningful Change

A few analyses have determined that considerable delay in
selection is inherent and defies reduction, although some delay may
be rectified or ameliorated. During 1961, the ABA found an
irreducible element of intrinsic delay stating, for example, that three
months was the shortest practicable time to complete the nomination
phase under ideal circumstances and the average had previously been
more than double that. 61 In 1987, the City Bar seriously doubted that
the average period from vacancy to confirmation could ever be less
than eight months, even with the best of intentions and additional
effort, and proclaimed that achieving this temporal goal would not
resolve the persistent conundrum.62 The entity voiced little optimism
about finding very efficacious solutions.63 Those who prepared the
1994 FJC report remarked that numerous measures, which might
remedy the permanent difficulty by enhancing efficiency and
resources, could minimally improve appointments,64 although these
techniques only partly treat some reasons for delay and merely limit
other causes, such as politics. Thus, conflicts among powerful
59. Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 335 (noting the impact of delay on other elements
of the selection process).
60. Id. For more discussion of the FBI and ABA roles, see supra notes 40-41, 43 and
accompanying text; infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
61. See 86 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 503, 507 (1961).
62. See The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 377.
63. For example, the Committee on Federal Courts discovered no single point of
delay in the multi-faceted selection process, which if corrected, would substantially
remedy the problem. Id. at 378. Indeed, the Committee found quite the opposite with
respect to different candidates, delay occurs at different stages. Id. at 376. Although the
Committee considered it important that unnecessary delays in the appointment system be
eliminated, it saw no practical way in which the average time lag of ten months or more
between vacancy and candidate clearance is likely to be improved appreciably in the
foreseeable future. Id. at 377. "But when all is said and done, the process simply cannot
be streamlined to a point that the problem of persistent vacancies will be eliminated." Id.
at378.
64. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 344 (observing that vacancies may well occur
more rapidly than they can be filled, regardless of measures adopted to expedite the
appointment process).
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interests will continue to slow the process, unless some form of merit
selection that reduces the importance of politics is instituted.65
The longstanding conundrum has persisted since the 1970s
without change, despite concerted efforts of judges and attorneys to
assess and publicize the difficulty as well as to request that the
political branches address it.66 Illustrative are monthly compilations
of all vacancies and of specific openings that comprise judicial
emergencies, which the Judicial Conference broadly distributes.
Moreover, Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist and
many additional jurists have aggressively attempted to prevent delay,
and the organized bar has frequently pursued the issue.67
iv. Effects of the Persistent Vacancies Problem

The permanent vacancies dilemma has imposed numerous
disadvantages.
One analysis ascertained that openings can
significantly limit the courts' ability to resolve their filings,
particularly given the relatively few judges throughout the United
States and the small number in some individual courts.68 The empty
seats and increased cases have placed unnecessary pressure on sitting
judges and posed complications for litigants and counsel who are
competing for scarce court resources.69 The FJC study determined
that openings had a statistically significant effect on average judicial
workloads for the time spanning 1970 through 1992.70 If the courts
had been functioning with complete staff, workloads of appeals and
district judges would have declined nine and ten percent,
respectively.71 In fact, since the 1990s, the federal judiciary has
experienced a backlog of approximately 250,000 civil suits, while
criminal caseloads have essentially precluded a number of district
judges from trying any civil matters in a particular year.72
65. This possibility seems unlikely. See id.; see also The Problem of Judicial
Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375-77.
66. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 539 (citing recommendations by an ABA
commission to fill judicial vacancies); The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at
378 (observing that judges have spoken out on the issue and that the Judicial Conference
has published vacancies lists).
67. See THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1997, at 6; Ruth Hochberger, 3 Bar Presidents Hit
Delay In Filling U.S. Court Seats, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 24, 1981, at 1. For decades the bench and
bar have urged expedition, but the response time has only modestly improved. The
Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375.
68. See The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 374.
69. Id.
70. Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 327.
71. Id.
72. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 540.
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The Miller Commission expressed concern that the cumbersome,
protracted process detrimentally affects the federal justice system and
potential appointees, suggesting that the federal judiciary's quality
could decrease.73 During 1987, the City Bar warned lawmakers that
the disadvantages imposed by continued inaction must be balanced
with the frustration of justice produced by undue delay and the
substantial price in popular respect that the highly visible bench pays
when judges cannot discharge their constitutionally-assigned duties in
a timely and efficient manner.74 Leaving this recurrent problem
unaddressed might undermine the regard that citizens have for
Congress and the President.
2. The Current Impasse
Political considerations seem to have greater significance for the
current problem than the persistent one, although politics pervade
both, thus obfuscating their relationship. Political factors drive the
existing dilemma and share much responsibility with the persistent
problem for recent Fourth Circuit selection. Temporal proximity
frustrates appreciation of how the present difficulty developed.
This subsection attempts to proffer an accurate account of the
current impasse through the conduct and observations of people and
entities actively involved in the process. The Essay emphasizes the
second Clinton Administration, particularly its first year, as well as
the initial year of the George W. Bush Administration, because
selection in 1997 and 2001 was relatively similar and rather recent.
The focus chosen is appropriate, even though the existing problem
apparently originated earlier, perhaps with the 1987 Senate rejection
of Judge Bork.
Numerous political phenomena, which attended appointments
throughout the last decade and a half, contributed significantly to the
present dilemma, although certain aspects of the generic difficulty did
implicate selection in 1997 and 2001. Each President and the Senate
were primarily responsible for most of the phenomena that constitute
the current problem. These public officials could have rectified or
ameliorated many of the complications, if they had the political will.
The periods that the Clinton and Bush Administrations and the
respective Senates needed for completing nomination and
confirmation were substantial in 1997 and 2001. For example, during
1997, nominations on average required more than 600 days, while
73. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
74. See The Problem ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 383.
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confirmations consumed a record high 183 days.75 Most of the delay
in judicial selection continued to occur between the date of vacancy
and nomination.
a. Nomination Process
The failure to confirm more judges in 1997 and 2001 can be
ascribed partly to delay in tendering nominees and the delay of
particular Senators or additional political officials who suggested
individuals for the President to consider.76 Nevertheless, during 1997,
other participants, including Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), then
chair of the Judiciary Committee; Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.), then
Senate Majority Leader; and specific Republican Senators, slowed the
process somewhat because of concerns about phenomena, such as
"judicial activism."77 During 2001, their counterparts, Senators Leahy
(D-Vt.) and Daschle (D-S.D.), may have similarly contributed to
delay out of concerns regarding the political views of certain Bush
nominees.78
Both Presidents apparently had some responsibility for the
rather few judicial appointments that resulted from delays in
submitting nominees. For example, on January 7, 1997, President
Clinton provided the names of twenty-two lawyers, a number of
whom he had nominated during the prior Congress and certain of
whom had secured confirmation hearings or favorable committee
votes, while President Bush only proffered bis first group of nominees
in May 2001.79 Thereafter, the Clinton and Bush Administrations
gradually, but steadily and rather promptly, forwarded more names.
Illustrative was Clinton's submission of thirteen individuals for
district court seats immediately before the August recess on July 31,

75. See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also
Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
1997, at A15 (claiming confirmation required ninety-one days and nominations required
618 days); Editorial, Clearing the Bench: Federal Court Vacancies are Delaying Justice,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at 16A (reciting similar statistics); supra note 32
and accompanying tei..'t (affording comparable data for 1980-1995).
76. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 541; Savage, supra note 1.
77. See, e.g., Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcomm on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 105th Cong.
(1997), 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
78. See, e.g., Groner, supra note 2; Savage, supra note 1.
79. See U.S Newswire, President Clinton Nominates 22 to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7,
1997), 1997 WL 5710163; PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS].
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1997.80 Most of the nominees of each President appeared to possess
fine professional qualifications, and some had prior experience in the
federal or state court judiciaries.81 A number of the nominees had
seemingly moderate political perspectives, a few were affiliated with
the party not occupying the White House, and the predecessors of
both Presidents had appointed some to the district bench.82
The Presidents' propensity to forward large batches of people on
the eve of Senate recesses and their general handling of the
nomination process exemplified several problems.83 When the
Presidents provided numerous candidates at one time, particularly as
the Senate was about to recess, this complicated Judiciary Committee
efforts to facilitate confirmation. Clinton had tendered a mere eight
new nominees by June 1997, while Senator Hatch considered
unacceptable most people included in the January set, thus permitting
him to allege that there were not enough people for efficient
Committee processing.84
Neither President forwarded nominees for all available
vacancies, which would have enabled them to pressure the Judiciary
Committee and the Senate, although each could have claimed that
there was no reason to provide greater numbers of nominees than the
respective committee chairs had indicated the panel would review.85
In fact, in much of 1997 and some of 2001, the administrations placed
80. See U.S. Newswire, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal Bench
(July 31, 1997), 1997 WL 5714533. Bush submitted similarly substantial groups before
2001 Senate recesses. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal Bench,
AM. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 3, 2001, http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&
oldid=ZZZGlCZBYPC (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
81. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79; see also Carl Tobias, Filling the
Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996); Sheldon Goldman &
Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE
254 (1997). See generally 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
82. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81; Savage, supra note 4.
83. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 541-42.
84. See Hatch, supra note 75; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track: Vacant Federal
Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A12. Analogous are President Bush's
submission of relatively few new nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's apparently
considering unacceptable some nominees in the May package. See, e.g., Tobias, supra
note 38, at 107; Groner, supra note 2.
85. In 1997, Senator Hatch held one hearing each month the Senate was in session for
one appeals and four or five district court nominees. See infra note 93. President Bush
has accused Senate Democrats of failing to hold hearings for his nominees, but Senator
Leahy has stated that the confirmation pace in 2001 "exceeded the pace of confirmations
in President Clinton's first year." Neil A. Le\vis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade
Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9.
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before the committee more nominees than the chairs had suggested
they would review. 86 Finally, both Clinton and Bush had to balance
the necessity for speed with cautious analysis of designees' abilities
and political viability because nominees who were controversial or,
worse, lacked competence or honesty, could have undermined
administration credibility and might have delayed, stopped, or
harmed the process.
Senate members and politicians from the locales where openings
occurred, who were to suggest people for the Presidents'
consideration, apparently contributed to slowed submission for many
vacancies in 1997 and 2001. For instance, in some states with no
Senators of the President's party, identifying those political figures
who were to make the recommendations was difficult. Addressing
Senators' insistence on participating also delayed the process. For
example, during Clinton's administration, Republican Senators from
Arizona and Washington demanded that they be involved in
candidate selection and even be allowed to tender suggestions.87
Insofar as the administrations might have better encouraged
Senate members or additional politicians to expedite their proposals
to the President, Executive Branch personnel may have done too
little or been stymied by the "start-up" costs of establishing a
presidency.88 For instance, the second Clinton Administration spent
considerable time in 1997 replacing the Deputy and Associate
Attorneys General as well as the White House Counsel, while
ongoing Whitewater investigations and numerous additional matters
could have deflected the attention of many attorneys in both offices.89
The nascent Bush Administration experienced similar difficulties,
such as securing prompt confirmation of certain high-level Justice

86. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 542.
87. See Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma),
Aug. 12, 1997, at Bl, http://www.tribnet.com/archives (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 1997 WL 3458401; Neil A. Lewis,
Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1997, at A30; see also 143
CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (asserting
that Republican Senators may have so intimated).
88. Helen Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate
GOP to Pick Up Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs.
Clinton, \VASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A6, http://www.washtimes.com/archives.htm (last
visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 1997 WL
3680583; see also Savage, supra note 82.
89. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 543-44; see also President's Counsel Quits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at B22.
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Department officials, which may have distracted judicial recruiters
from selection.90
In short, Presidents Clinton and Bush discharged their
responsibilities for the nomination of judicial candidates in analogous
ways during 1997 and 2001. To be sure, certain procedures that each
President deployed are distinguishable, but these are differences of
degree rather than kind. Both administrations might also have
ameliorated some difficulties they encountered, particularly by
capitalizing on lessons derived from prior efforts, although a number
of complications may be inherent in the process.
b.

ABA Committee

During the 104th Congress, the ABA Committee continued to
rank candidates' qualifications as the entity had been doing since the
1950s.
Senator Hatch voiced increasing concern about this
involvement and, in February 1997, the chair ended formal ABA
participation.91 During March 2001, the Bush Administration notified
the American Bar Association that it would not solicit its advice prior
to submitting nominations.92

90. See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, Senate Panel Ends Wrangling, Approves 3 Key Justice
Posts, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A4, http://www.washtimes.com/archives.htm (last
visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 2001 WL
4152968; Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58-42, Closing a
Five Week Battle, N.Y. T!MES, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al. But see 147 CONG. REC. S8552 (daily
ed. Aug. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (praising the Judiciary Committee's
expeditious consideration of Bush nominees). See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's
Ascent, NEW YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50 (assessing Attorney General Ashcroft and the
Justice Department).
91. See Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J. (June 1997), at 32; see also
supra note 43 and accompanying text (assessing the ABA's role). But see N. Lee Cooper,
Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1997), at 6 (identifying the important role
of the committee in the nominee evaluation process).
92. See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett,
ABA President (Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also
Laura Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37 (2002). Democrats' insistence on ABA input led to more delay.
Because the ABA long played a greater role in helping Presidents ascertain whether to
proceed with designees, it may have future influence, but this is unclear. See Hearings on
Judicial Nominations Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
[hereinafter Hearings on Judicial Nominations] (statement of Sen. Leahy), at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=l81&wit_id=50 (last visited
Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("[T]he White House last
year unilaterally changed the practice of nine Republican and Democratic Presidents and
will no longer allow the ABA to begin its peer reviews during the selection process ....").
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Confirmation Process

In 1997 and 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee bore some
responsibility for delay principally through its inability to investigate,
hold hearings for, and vote on more nominees. For instance, Senator
Hatch ordinarily conducted a hearing at which one appeals court and
four or five district court nominees appeared every month of the
105th Congress's first session.93 However, the committee did not
meticulously do so, and the Senate had approved a mere nine judges
by early September.94 Moreover, the Bush Administration and other
observers criticized the Senate for holding too few hearings,
especially involving appellate court seats, and for confirming only
twenty-eight judges in 2001, although the committee seemed to
process individuals more expeditiously and had afforded every district
court nominee a hearing by spring 2002.95
The dearth of 1997 appointments seemed attributable partly to
deficient Judiciary Committee resources and to politics. For example,
Senator Hatch resolved the perennial dispute over the ABA, while
Republican Senators debated the roles of the committee, its chair,
and particular members, and chose to preserve the status quo. 96
These controversies required resources that could have expedited
confirmation.97 The rather few appointments in 2001 similarly might
have resulted from committee devotion of insufficient resources and
partially from politics.98 Nevertheless, Senator Leahy instituted
93. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 545. This was the practice he followed in the 104th
Congress. See Al Kamen, Window Closing on Judicial Openings, WASH. POST, June 12,
1995, at A17 (stating that the Republican-controlled committee confirmed one appellate
and three or four district court judges a month).
94. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744-45 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), committee
chair from 1987 until 1994, claimed in March 1997 that two hearings occurred each month
during his tenure. 143 CONG. REC. S2539 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997).
95. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 85; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats are Pushed on Judicial
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22; Savage, supra note 1. The most
controversial dispute involved Judiciary Committee rejection of Judge Charles Pickering
on a 10-9 party-line vote after contentious hearings and debate. See Albert R. Hunt, The
Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at A19; Neil A. Lewis, First
Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.17, 2002, at A35. A similar
dispute occurred over Judge Brooks Smith, but he eventually secured a 12-7 vote and
confirmation on July 31, 2002. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Approves Bush Appeals Court
Pick, N. Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A19.
96. See Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1997, at D22; Obstruction of Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1997, at 9; see also
supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. The Committee processed few nominees while resolving those disputes. See
Tobias, supra note 11, at 545.
98. Hearings on Judicial Nominations, supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy), at
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special efforts to speed the process, such as conducting hearings in the
August recess. 99 Insofar as specific Democratic Senators slowed
confirmation, they might have been "paying back" Republicans for
their perceived delay when considering Clinton nominees. 100
Moreover, the May decision of Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.) to
become an independent meant that the Senate only reached an
organizational agreement in July, which significantly postponed the
process's commencement and smooth operation.101
In fairness, individuals who enjoy life tenure and exercise the
state's enormous power require careful scrutiny to guarantee that
they are qualified. While striking the proper balance between close
analysis and expedition is difficult, Senator Hatch argued that he
preferred to fulfill that obligation with much care, and caution may
have contributed less than politics to slowed confirmation.102
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_ statement.cfm?id=181&wit_id=50 (last visited
Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); id. (statement of Sen.
Hatch), at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=204&wit_id=51
(last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Symposium,
The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1-176 (2001);
Jonathan Ringel, Picking Judges: The Art of the Deal, THE RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at
1, 04/30/2001 Recorder (San Francisco, CA.) 1; Ringel, supra note 80; William Safire,
Battle of the Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33.
99. See Hearings on Judicial Nominations, supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy), at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/pjl082201f.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); id. (statement of Sen. Leahy), at http://www.senate.
gov/-judiciary/oldsite/pjl082701f.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22.
100. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Aid Bill is Stalled By Bid to Force Votes on Judge, WALL ST.
J., Oct.17, 2001, at A16; Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL
ST. J., May 9, 2001, at A26; Hunt, supra note 95; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in
Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002 at A33.
101. See David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords Defects From GOP Creating Era of
'Tripartisanship', WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A16; Editorial, True Bipartisanship, WALL
ST. J., May 31, 2001, at A16. The Presidents were also responsible for the few
confirmations because, in early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few names, some of whom
the chair or his colleagues seemed to find unacceptable, and provided others irregularly,
thus complicating processing. However, Hatch's claim that he had too few nominees to
consider lacked persuasiveness because equal delay resulted from the few hearings for,
and votes on, nominees and specific Senators' opposition. Similarly, by the conclusion of
2001, Bush had furnished enough nominees, but that date may have been too late. See
supra notes 79, 85-90 and accompanying text.
102. Hatch faced conflicts in Senate traditions and his obligations to Republican
colleagues, who were concerned about activist judges, and he did resist the challenge to
Senate conventions. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Neil A. Lewis,
Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1997, at 1
(describing how Senator Hatch became embroiled in the appointments controversy). He
also processed some nominees, even castigating his GOP colleagues for opposing them,
and the 1997 record resembled some in prior comparable periods. See, e.g., 143 CONG.
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Senator Lott and the Republican leadership seemed to have
greater responsibility for delay during 1997. The chamber had
confirmed only nine judges by September 1997, although the
Judiciary Committee had approved and sent to the floor significantly
more people. 103 Some delay in placing nominees with favorable
committee votes on the Senate calendar and according them floor
debates and votes was understandable, given the press of other
significant business and the chamber's unanimous consent
procedure.104
However, the few judges confirmed in 1997, especially as
contrasted with prior sessions, indicate that much responsibility lay
with the Senate majority's leadership and its scheduling of floor votes.
As the 105th Congress commenced, Lott promised to assess closely
Clinton's nominees.105 In spring 1997, Senator Leahy, the Judiciary
Committee's ranking minority member, and other Democrats
apparently responded by informing the Senate that they had
expedited appointments in Republican administrations and by urging
floor debate and votes on nominees. 106
d. Nomination and Confirmation
Numerous difficulties related to nomination and confirmation
evaluated in the prior discussion of the persistent dilemma
accompanied selection during 1997 and 2001.107 For example, some
administration and Senate personnel involved with the process
seemed to not comprehend the problem's severity, as witnessed in the
REC. S2515, S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Ted Gest
& Lewis Lord, The GO P's Judicial Freeze: A Fight to See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 23 (discussing the battle over judicial
appointments during the Clinton presidency); Novak, supra note 75, at 38 (detailing the
major reasons why appointments have been delayed).
103. This dynamic resembled Republican processing in the 1996 election year. See 143
CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Hatch,
supra note 75; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 257 (recounting 1996
treatment); Tobias, supra note 94, at 744-45 (same).
104. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 546.
105. See Lewis, supra note 87. See generally Gest & Lord, supra note 102; Novak,
supra note 75.
106. For example, Senator Biden insisted that all nominees have floor votes, while
Senator Sarbanes claimed the Republicans would not even afford up-or-down votes. See
143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997). When Lott reportedly said he would
move no nominations until Clinton filled four Federal Election Commission vacancies,
Leahy discussed non-controversial nominees (those who had bipartisan support and
unanimous committee votes) to courts under pressure. See 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily
ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
107. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
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uneven pace of nominations and of Committee scrutiny. Certain
observers, especially Senators, claimed that the present complication
and much delay were basically animated by politics and even by
concerns regarding candidates' ideology. For instance, in 1997,
Senators Biden and Sarbanes suggested that their Republican
colleagues were politicizing the process and altering two centuries of
tradition. 108
An effort which some observers found political and which
seemingly implicated the existing impasse and delay was the endeavor
of Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to examine the allocation of
judicial resources and their employment in the regional circuits.109
For example, his subcommittee conducted hearings to determine
whether the courts needed more judges or even required their present
complements.11° Most relevant to this Essay, Chief Judge Wilkinson
testified that the Fourth Circuit functions effectively with fewer than
all of the positions authorized,111 while Grassley issued a report that
echoed Wilkinson's idea and found that virtually no court needed
additional judges.112
The appropriate use of judicial resources is a valid Senate
concern, but this initiative may have slowed selection for appeals
courts, which have experienced high percentages of vacancies, many

108. 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). Biden even stated on the
Senate floor that the Republicans were attempting to prevent Clinton from appointing
judges, especially for the appeals courts. Id. at S2538. Some experts offered similar ideas.
Professor Sheldon Goldman said "'a newly-elected president has [never] faced this kind
of challenge to his judicial nominations,' " while Professor Geoffrey Stone found the
Republican actions " 'a scandalous and stunningly irresponsible misuse of the Senate's
authority.' " See Gest & Lord, supra note 102 (quoting Professors Goldman and Stone).
109. See U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT
AND THE COURTS, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF
JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (Mar. 1999) (Sen. Grassley,
Chair), available at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/graphics/genera-2.pdf [hereinafter
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT]; infra note 110.
110. Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6. See generally Carl Tobias, The
Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549, 557-69 (2000)
(assessing Fourth Circuit data compared to other regional circuits and judges' views on
additional judgeships).
111. See Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 12-18; see also Tobias,
supra note 94, at 749-50 (discussing how many judges oppose expanding the size of the
federal judiciary); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal
Judiciary, 43 EMORY L. J. 1147 (1994).
112. See CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 109. For a more detailed analysis of the
Fourth Circuit specifically, see Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, in CHAIRMAN'S REPORT,
supra note 109, § II(d), available at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/graphics/fourth.pdf
[hereinafter Analysis of the Fourth Circuit].
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judicial emergencies, and increasing caseloads.113
Moreover,
Congress has authorized no new appellate judgeships since 1990,
although the Judicial Conference suggested that lawmakers approve
numerous additional seats, a proposal based on expert conservative
judgments and systematically assembled empirical data related to
appeals and workloads.114
Rather similar developments attended selection in 2001. For
instance, three of the eleven appeals court nominees proposed by
Bush in May received Judiciary Committee hearings during that
year. 115 In fairness, Senator Leahy and other Democrats, such as
Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), stated publicly that the Senate
would expedite processing of nominees whom they considered highly
competent and politically moderate.116 For example, the Senate did
confirm Judge Gregory and Judge Barrington Parker, whom
President Clinton had initially appointed. 117
Numerous actions of Senators whose party did not occupy the
White House supported the claims that the existing conundrum and
delays were politically motivated, especially out of concern about
nominees' perceived ideological views. Illustrative has been the high
percentage of appeals court vacancies, which Senate members view as
more important than district courts, because appellate rulings govern
multiple states and the shrunken Supreme Court docket means the
regional circuits increasingly serve as courts of last resort for those
areas.118
113. Twenty-five judgeships were vacant. See Judicial Boxscore As of August 1, 1997,
THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1997, at
8. For relevant data on docket growth, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 58-64 (1996); LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 28,
atlO.
114. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 1271 (discussing Conference proposals); Tobias,
supra note 94, at 753 (describing the proposals as conservative); see also S. 678, 105th
Cong. (1997) (providing judgeships); 143 CONG REC. S2538-S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming that the Conference documented needs to fill
vacancies and to authorize more judges but Republicans urged the decommissioning of
judgeships); Letter from Leonadis Ralph Mecham, Secretary, to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May
28, 2002) (urging the creation of new judgeships) (on file \vith the North Carolina Law
Review).
115. See Jonathan Groner, Privilege Fight Looms Over Estrada, LEGAL TIMES, June 3,
2002, at 1; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. But see infra note 117 and
accompanying text (stating that the Senate confirmed only two of the nominees).
116. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, First Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at A35; Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom Over Bush's Nominees
for Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A24.
117. See Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Circuit, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 25, 2001, at 1; Masters, supra note 3.
118. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP.
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Prospects for Change

To the extent that many political considerations attending
selection in 1997 and 2001 and fostering the present difficulty are
intrinsic, they may defy treatment. For instance, the analysis of
permanent openings suggested approaches that enhanced efficiency
and resources will minimally limit delay resulting from politics.11 9
Nonetheless, the evaluation of political phenomena constituting the
current dilemma indicates that public officers might rectify them if
the officials had sufficient political will. For instance, political factors
are all that appeared to prevent Presidents Clinton and Bush from
promptly tendering more nominees with comparatively moderate
political perspectives and a majority of Senators from expeditiously
approving them.
f.

Effects of the Current Impasse

The existing complication has had numerous deleterious impacts,
many of which are analogous to those that the persistent vacancies
problem imposed. 120 For example, the present dilemma has pressured
courts and parties, the effects of which are manifested in judges'
workloads. 121 The judiciary now experiences a large civil backlog,122
and docket growth and openings in a third of the Ninth Circuit's
positions required it to cancel 600 oral arguments during 1997.123 In
July 1997, the imminent crisis produced by extraordinary numbers of
judicial vacancies and the difficulties that attend delayed
appointments led the presidents of seven major legal associations to
author an open letter urging President Clinton and Senator Lott to
commit sufficient resources to expedite confirmation.124 These ideas

er. REV. 403, 403-404 (1997); Lewis, supra note 96.
119. See supra notes 64--65 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
121. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 550-51; Gest & Lord, supra note 102, at 24.
122. See Gest & Lord, supra note 102, at 23-24; see also Robert Schmidt, The Costs of
Judicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (discussing the District of Columbia's
judicial backlog); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1, LEXIS, News & Business Library, News, U.S. News File
(arguing that judicial vacancies created the backlog).
123. See Novak, supra note 75, at 37; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives,
Justice On Hold, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at 9A, LEXIS, News & Business
Library, News, U.S. News File (stating that Sixth Circuit canceled sixty arguments).
During 1997, Senator Leahy claimed that a significant number of federal prosecutors had
to forgo cases or enter plea bargains because there were insufficient judges to hear cases.
See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
124. Letter to William J. Clinton, President of the United States, & Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et al. (July 14, 1997),
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evidence how openings detrimentally affect millions of individuals.
Insofar as the public ascribes the current impasse to partisan politics,
the activity can undermine respect for the government, particularly
the President and the Senate.
C.

Fourth Circuit Developments

The origins and growth of the considerations that have fostered
controversy over Fourth Circuit judicial selection resemble in certain,
and differ in other, ways from the national developments detailed
above. The background related to the Fourth Circuit also has deep
historical roots and is rather complicated. For instance, Senator
Helms has trenchantly admonished that no Republican appointee
from North Carolina has served on the appellate court since President
Calvin Coolidge named Judge John J. Parker.125
Several factors suggest that the persistent vacancies conundrum
had somewhat limited relevance for the Fourth Circuit until quite
recently. These considerations include the comparatively few appeals
which litigants and attorneys took to the court, the rather small
number of active appellate judgeships -that Congress authorized for
the Fourth Circuit, and the relative infrequency with which openings
arose on the court. For example, in the 1970s, the Fourth Circuit, like
numerous appeals courts, continued to receive a manageable quantity
of filings-minuscule percentages of which were complex126-to
accord most cases appellate justice,127 to operate with few active
judges (seven),128 and to experience only occasional vacancies that
Presidents and the Senate could expeditiously fill. 129

reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. at S8046. The bar association presidents warned that large
numbers of judicial vacancies and delays in judicial confirmation were eroding democracy.
125. See Firestone, supra note 1; see also David Savage, Clinton Losing Fight for Black
Judge: His Nominees to All-White 4th Circuit are Blocked by Sen. Helms, L.A. TIMES, July
7, 2000, at Al (discussing recent Court of Appeals nominations).
126. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 327-28; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS
OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14-30 (1994) (discussing the design and tradition of
federal appellate courts as well as the concept of appellate justice); JUDITH MCKENNA,
STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 911 (1993) (explaining the process of the Court of Appeals and the concept of appellate
justice).
128. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (increasing the number of active circuit judgeships in
the Fourth Circuit to seven); Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 323-24; supra notes 24 and
accompanying text.
129. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 329-31; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Beginning in the late 1970s, the Fourth Circuit began
encountering significant docket growth and its membership increased
to ten when the omnibus judgeships statute passed. 130 Even rising
caseloads and the corresponding expansion of the court's complement
seemed to have little impact on selection during much of the 1980s.
For instance, Congress authorized a single new judgeship,131 while
President Ronald Reagan and Senators smoothly filled those few
openings that occurred, so that the court had no vacancies at his
administration's conclusion.132 In short, the persistent vacancies
problem seemed to have little historical relevance for the Fourth
Circuit, although it may have affected appointments during the 1990s.
In contrast, the present impasse apparently has much salience. A
1990 Act enlarged the court to fifteen judges.133 A number of circuit
seats opened in the George Bush Administration, which realized
considerable success in appointing judges before 1992 but
experienced some difficulty filling the positions during that election
year.134 Democrats, who controlled the Senate, attributed the
complications to delayed nomination of candidates they found
acceptable, while the Republican Party claimed that the majority
slowed the processing of well-qualified candidates because they
hoped a Democrat would capture the White House in 1992.135 In any
event, when Bush left office, the Fourth Circuit had several vacancies,
for one of which he had nominated Judge Boyle.136

130. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)). See generally WILLIAM MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL
COURT CASELOADS (1984) (analyzing docket growth).
131. See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 346 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)).
132. See GOLDMAN, supra note 39, at 285-345 (assessing Reagan's judicial selection).
133. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202, 104 Stat. 5089,
5098-99 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (adding four judgeships to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). See generally Sheldon
Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993)
[hereinafter Goldman, Final] (assessing the Judgeship Act and Bush's judicial selection
legacy); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294 (1991) [hereinafter Goldman, Imprint] (assessing Bush's judicial
selection).
134. Bush nominated, and the Senate confirmed, three judges in 1990 and 1991. For an
analysis of Bush's judicial selection, see Goldman, Final, supra note 133; Goldman,
Imprint, supra note 133.
135. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Biden); Goldman, Final, supra note 133; see also Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial
Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1270-74 (assessing Bush's judicial selection).
136. See, e.g., Firestone, supra note 1; Brooke A. Masters, For One Nominee Fight
Ahead, WASH. POST, May 18, 2001, at A29; Monk, supra note 1.
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President Clinton enjoyed marginally greater success. During
1995, the President first attempted to elevate James A. Beaty, Jr.,
whom he had named a United States District Judge for the Middle
District of North Carolina two years earlier, but Senator Helms and
Senator Hatch blocked Beaty's consideration.137 In 1999, Clinton
nominated James Wynn, who serves as a judge on the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, and the jurist received similar Senate treatment. 138
Helms premised his actions on the claim that the Fourth Circuit was
operating well without its full judicial complement.139 During
October 2000, the President nominated Professor Elizabeth Gibson
of the University of North Carolina School of Law140 and Andre
Davis, a United States District Judge for the District of Maryland;141
however, the chamber processed neither person.
Clinton did appoint Fourth Circuit Judges Blane Michael and
Robert King from West Virginia, whose rather smooth confirmations
may reflect their non-controversial candidacies or the political
acumen of longtime Democratic Senator Robert Byrd.142 The
President also named Diana Gribbon Motz, who had served on the
Maryland Court of Appeals, as the first Fourth Circuit female judge
from Maryland, while he elevated William B. Traxler, Jr., whom Bush
placed on the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. 143 Finally, Clinton's Article II recess appointment of Roger
137. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 187-88; Monk, supra note 136; Charles
Ogletree, Why Has the G.O.P. Kept Blacks Off Federal Courts?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2000, at A25; Savage, supra note 125; see also Editorial, Confirm Judge Beaty,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 8, 1996, at 14A.
138. See, e.g., Firestone, supra note 1; Masters, supra note 136; see also Editorial,
Filling Out the Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 14, 1999, at A28.
139. See Ogletree, supra note 137; James Rosen, Edwards Backs Wynn for 4th Circuit
Judgeship, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 5, 1999, at A3; Savage, supra note
125; see also Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6 (providing the testinlony of
Fourth Circuit Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson who proffered a similar assertion).
140. See U.S. Newswire, President Clinton Nominates S. Elizabeth Gibson to the
Federal Bench (Oct. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 26850371; Anne Blythe, Appeals Court Nominee
Realistic, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 2000, at 1B (Orange Co. Ed.).
141. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228, 248 (2001); Lyle Denniston, Politics, Race Cloud Naming of Judges to
U.S. 4th Circuit, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 8, 2001, at lA; Maria Glod, New U.S. Judge's
Future Uncertain, WASH. POST, Jan 19, 2001, at BS.
142. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Adding Diversity to the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 27,
1993. at 7; Francis X. Clines, How Do West Virginians Spell Pork? It's B-Y-R-D, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2002, at Al; Lawrence Messina, "Tenacious" Judge Takes Seat Today,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.Va.), Oct. 23, 1998, at lA, 1998 WL 5977846.
143. See, e.g., Marcia Myers, Diana Motz Joins Federal Bench Today, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 22, 1994, at lB; see also Clinton Picks Motz for U.S. Appeals Court, BALTIMORE
SUN, Jan. 28, 1994, at 2B; Traxler Nominated to 4th Circuit Court, CHARLESTON POST &
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Gregory partly led President George W. Bush to nominate, and the
Senate to confirm, Gregory in July 2001.144 Despite these efforts,
when Clinton completed his second term, the fifteen-member court
technically had five empty seats, one of which Gregory ultimately
filled.
The significant number of vacancies now experienced by the
Fourth Circuit, and the considerable time that they have remained
open, has apparently limited its delivery of appellate justice in several
ways. For example, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals, which recently conducted a one-year
study at the behest of Congress, ascertained that the Fourth Circuit
affords the smallest percentage of published opinions in the country
and its percentage of oral arguments ties for the lowest.145 The court's
eleven percent figure for published determinations is twelve points
under the system-wide average. 146 Its thirty percent statistic for oral
arguments is ten points below the national average and less than onehalf the percentage granted in the First and Second Circuits. 147 The
relatively few published dispositions and oral arguments are useful
measures of appellate justice and effective performance, which
involve significant process values, such as open court access. Opinion
publication and oral argument can enhance judicial accountability,
visibility, and fairness to litigants.148
The Fourth Circuit operates efficaciously in other ways. For
instance, the Commission found that the court attains the systemic
average for most resolution time indicators and for merits
terminations per judgeship.149 Chief Judge Wilkinson testified
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), July 11, 1998, at B6, http://www.charleston.neUPSUser/
psrecord.htm?NS_doc_offset=O&NS_doc_returned=l&NS_adv_search=O&NS_search_set
=dkgOxCuyv65afOe80a8530d&NS_template_dir=/docs/templates/archives&NS_initial_frm
=1 (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
144. See Masters, supra note 3; Mitchell, supra note 3.
145. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at22 tbls.2-6 & 2-7.
146. See id. at 22 tbl.2-7 (providing the data on published opinions and oral
arguments). But see Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1 (finding that the
court operates well).
147. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22 tbl.2-6. But see Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary, supra note 6 at 12-18 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson) (asserting that the
court operates well).
148. See BAKER, supra note 127, at 14-30; MCKENNA, supra note 127, at 9-11. See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987)
(assessing process values).
149. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS, 93 tbl.l; 95 tbl.7. The Senate report found its
disposition rate the "fastest" and "by this important measure, [the court is] in excellent
shape." Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 2. Accord Hearing Before the
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correspondingly that the tribunal functions well without its full
complement of authorized judges.150 Moreover, the 1999 report
compiled by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts found that the tribunal works effectively
and needs no additional positions. It also asserted that new
judgeships might threaten efficiency and circuit law's clarity and
stability, in part by fostering inconsistent resolution and invocation of
the en bane process.151 The Senate study further claimed that the
tribunal performs well because it judiciously employs staff attorneys,
screens through telephone conferences, restricts argument in "more
significant cases" and allows no argument in "routine" appeals,
permits informal briefs and summary dispositions, and uses
prepublication opinion circulation to promote uniform decisionmaking.152 Most of these measures conserve resources, but other
approaches, such as leaving publication and counsel appointment for
indigent pro se litigants in essence to one judge's discretion, can limit
court access. 153 Thus, although the Commission's raw data suggest the
Fourth Circuit may operate less efficaciously than it could, this
material is inconclusive and additional sources indicate the court
functions rather well.

Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 12-18 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson). Recent
statistics agree. See U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time Intervals in Cases Terminated
After Hearing or Submission, by Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30,
200I, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/ b04sep01.pdf {last visited Aug.
22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This may reflect the few
published opinions and oral arguments afforded.
150. See Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 14 (testimony of Chief
Judge Wilkinson); see also Brooke Masters, Virginian May End the Impasse Over
Integrating Court, WASH. POST, July 30, 2000, at Cl; supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
151. Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at l, 3. Accord Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 13 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson). See generally
Tobias, supra note 110, at 565 (assessing views regarding additional judgeships' effects on
courts).
152. See Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1-2; Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 13 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson) (agreeing with
the findings in the subcommittee report); 4TH CIR. R. 33, 34, 36, I.O.P. 36.3. The court
resolves cases rather promptly, while any delay that might result from pre-publication
opinion circulation may be offset by increased intra-circuit consistency. See Analysis of the
Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1; Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6
(testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson); 4TH CIR. R. 36{a); supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
153. See 4TH OR. R. 34{b), 36(a). The recent study's scope, relative lack of empirical
data, and political nature are controversial. However, the subcommittee clearly has
authority to monitor the courts and their resources, and the subcommittee did attempt to
gather some data and seek judges' perspectives that are informed by experience.
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D. A Word About North Carolina Developments
The significant number of Fourth Circuit vacancies and the
protracted time they have remained open directly implicate North
Carolina. The most salient development relating to North Carolina is
that no judge from the state now serves on the Fourth Circuit. 154
Senator Helms often mentions this, but he is partly responsible for it.
In the 1970s, Helms may have prevented the nomination of Julius
Chambers, a renowned civil rights lawyer and former NAACP
General Counsel, and Professor William Van Alstyne, a preeminent
constitutional scholar at the Duke University School of Law, while
during the Clinton Administration, Helms blocked consideration of
Judge Beaty and Judge Wynn. 155 On May 9, 2001, President Bush
nominated Chief Judge Boyle of the Eastern District of North
Carolina at Helms's apparent instigation, but he has not received a
hearing. 156
Each state located within the purview of a specific appeals court
should have a judge on the tribunal who is stationed in the
jurisdiction, even though the judiciary is not a representative branch
of the federal government. An appellate judge whose chambers are
situated in a particular state generally will be more familiar with its
substantive law, which may help resolve appeals that implicate
diversity of citizenship,157 and with the jurisdiction's customs and
mores, which can facilitate efforts to reconcile federal policies and
more localized concems.158 The residents of a state may also have
greater confidence in, and find more acceptable, the decisions of an
154. See Firestone, supra note 1; Wagner, supra note 2.
155. J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., a former Dean of the University of North Carolina School
of Law, ultimately assumed the North Carolina seat. For events in the 1970s, see
GOLDMAN, supra note 39, at 273-74; Peter G. Fish, Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing
a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 635 (1979). For developments in the Clinton Administration, see supra notes 137-41
and accompanying text.
156. See PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79, at 725; Firestone, supra note 1; see
also Savage, supra note 4. See generally supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing
Boyle's nomination).
157. See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
"Mastery of State Law" may be overvalued, especially given the rather few appeals from
diversity cases. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 127, at 98; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1373 (1995) (reporting that of the 225
diversity cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the court affirmed three-fourths).
158. This is the regional circuits' federalizing function. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing generally the role of the
courts of appeals and federalization specifically); see also John Minor Wisdom, Requiem
for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980) (discussing directly the federalizing
role of the circuit courts).
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appellate court that includes a member who lives in their home state.
Indeed, when a regional circuit has no judge from a specific
jurisdiction for an extended period, its residents could develop an
unhealthy sense of estrangement from, and even distrust of, the
appeals court system that propounds an expanding corpus of federal
law that governs them. 159 These phenomena will be accentuated as
appellate caseload growth and a shrunken Supreme Court docket
increasingly convert the regional circuits into the courts of last resort
for their respective geographic areas.160 The Senate has traditionally
honored the convention of having a member from every state in a
regional circuit serve on the court, while Congress appears to have
considered the notion so compelling that lawmakers recently codified
it. 161
However, Senator Helms's actions during the Clinton
Administration and in the past necessitated departure from the
practice for the Fourth Circuit.
In sum, the earlier assessment of the generic vacancies problem
and of the present difficulty suggests these components may have
compromised the criminal and civil justice that the federal judiciary
affords. This situation deserves prompt, effective treatment. The
Essay's next segment explores a variety of approaches that officials in
the three branches could institute to address the circumstances.
II. ANALYSIS OF PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS
This part surveys numerous remedies for unfilled appeals court
vacancies, although several factors complicate the provision of
definitive suggestions. First, it is impossible to predict which political
party will capture disputed Senate seats, especially in North Carolina,
and a chamber majority this November, although Senate control will
be more critical than who wins the North Carolina race. Closely
related is timing. Before the elections, Senators will confirm few

159. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989: Hearing on S.948
Before Senate Judiciary Subcomm on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 247 (1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson). For an analysis of these
and related issues, see BAKER, supra note 127, at 95-98; see also Ninth Circuit Split:
Hearing on S.853 and S.956 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Simpson).
160. See POSNER, supra note 113, at 58-64, 80-81, 194-95 (discussing appeals growth
and the Supreme Court's shrunken docket). See generally Hellman, supra note 118
(examining the Supreme Court's shrunken docket).
161. See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2440, 2493 (1997)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994) by requiring each appellate court except the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to have "at least one circuit judge in
regular active service appointed from the residents of each [state] in that circuit").
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nominees already submitted, much less process new ones. Pragmatic,
political realities may mean that both parties must await the
November returns. Nonetheless, some ideas can be offered by
positing plausible scenarios. Thus, this section emphasizes the best
measures that the President, the Senate, and the Judiciary could
implement to rectify or ameliorate the political difficulties that have
attended Fourth Circuit selection.162
A.

The Executive Branch and the Senate

The President and Senators must do everything possible to
improve the discharge of their judicial appointments duties. For
instance, the Bush Administration and the Senate might undertake
efforts to streamline those responsibilities for the process that each
fulfills, while meticulously balancing analysis of nominees' character
and competence with the need to expedite selection.
Executive and legislative officers should treat increasing
politicization and recognize that attempts to address it may be
controversial and perhaps unsuccessful. The officials must work
together, reach reasonable accommodations, and efficaciously resolve
disputes when they occur. The officers should also cease participating
in activities, such as recriminations over who is most responsible for
delay, which are apparently animated by efforts to secure transitory
political victories and by gamesmanship.163 Insofar as growing
politicization slows the process and fosters the perception that
government officials are sacrificing the best interests of the courts and
the country for short-term partisan advantage, the phenomena could
erode public respect.
These ideas apply specifically to Fourth Circuit and North
Carolina appointments. For example, the President might redouble
his efforts to cooperate with Senators across the region by consulting
them before he formally nominates designees. Proposal of a nominee
for the second North Carolina opening provides an excellent
opportunity to seek this advice. All Senate members from states
162. See supra note 16. The persistent dilemma's best solution seems to be creation of
enough new positions to accord the judiciary every judge now authorized because this
would avoid certain theoretical, pragmatic, and legal problems. See Tobias, supra note 11,
at 569-70 (suggesting solutions such as creating enough positions to compensate for the
vacancies and creating floater judgeships). Other measures may only slightly decrease
essentially irreducible temporal restraints. For exposition of many solutions, few of which
apply to the Fourtlt Circuit, see id. at 552-72.
163. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 13, at 1033-35; Editorial, Eliminating Unnecessary
Delays in Filling Federal Judicial Vacancies, 83 JUDICATURE 100 (1999); Lloyd Cutler &
Mickey Edwards, End the Judicial Blame Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at A29.
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located in the court should closely communicate about important
issues, namely whether they will continue approving judges who are
from the same jurisdictions in which vacancies arise. The two
Senators representing each state in the Fourth Circuit must work
together and find a suitable candidate when a vacancy occurs in a
particular jurisdiction. They may even consider establishing an
intrastate merit-selection group, which could resemble the Circuit
Judge Nominating Commission employed by President Jimmy Carter
or the district panel that Bush as well as California Democratic
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer recently created.164
That concept might resonate in North Carolina, particularly if
Democrats retain the Senate and the new Senator wants to pursue a
cooperative relationship. Indeed, the leadership of the North
Carolina Bar Association recently proposed the creation of a
"bipartisan commission ... to recommend federal judicial nominees"
in an attempt "to break a bitter stalemate between North Carolina's
two Senators."165
B.

The Executive Branch

Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush had some responsibility
for the current openings.166 Bush may not have supplied enough
capable nominees with moderate political views for the Judiciary
Committee to process, and he must forward more names at a pace
that \vill facilitate its work. In fairness, Bush might have proceeded
cautiously because errors by a nascent administration can erode
credibility, promote delay, and threaten selection.
The President must assess and institute numerous conciliatory
measures because that approach could prove to be more effective and
he could rely on their prior invocation, should resort to less
cooperative mechanisms be warranted. The President must apply
practices that will enhance discharge of administration duties. For
164. For the Carter Commission, see LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION:
ITS MEMBERS,
PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A
Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 JlJDICATURE 136, 140 (1987).
For the California panel, see Caria Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given A Say Over Judges,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2001, at A3; Henry Weinstein, Judge Selection Process Set
Up Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Bl.
165. Wagner, supra note 2; Editorial, Better Way: Plan Would Make Obstructionism
Costly, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, June 26, 2002, at SA.
166. In early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few nominees, most of whom were well
qualified and rather moderate, but Hatch and Leahy claimed some were not. See supra
notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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instance, Bush could expedite nominations by compiling lists of
possible appellate court designees and expedite confirmation by
urging that the Judiciary Committee and the FBI eliminate redundant
investigation and evaluation.167 Bush should also examine the ABA's
exclusion from advance candidate review, as this decision has
increased delay due to Democratic insistence on informal ABA peer
review. 168 Other conciliatory ideas include submitting fewer nominees
Democrats will oppose. illustrative was the 2001 selection of Judge
Barrington Parker, whom Clinton had named to the district bench
and the Senate promptly approved. 169 Because most district judges
can easily secure appointment to appeals courts, elevation remains a
venerable technique.170
The President should at least consider nominating more wellqualified attorneys who have Democratic affiliations. 171
This
approach could be salutary in courts with protracted vacancies and
large caseloads and which are located in states that traditionally vote
for Democrats or have two Democratic Senators. The Sixth Circuit,
which has seven of its sixteen seats open and the fourth largest
docket, is a general instance, while Maryland, whose Senators
blocked a Bush candidate's nomination, affords a Fourth Circuit
example.172 The "Michigan seats" remain unfilled because the two

167. Bush could enhance nomination and confirmation through consultation with the
Judiciary Committee and with Senators and by implementing a merit-selection
commission. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; Hearings on Judicial Nominations,
supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (urging the current Bush Administration to
reconsider its decision to discontinue soliciting ABA advice before beginning the
confirmation process).
169. This occurred because Parker had been approved once, had Democrats' support,
and had experience derived from prior service, which informed analysis of his abilities and
character. The action resembled Clinton's elevation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, whom
former President George Bush had named. See Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate
Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B2; see also supra
note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the confirmations of Judge Gregory and
Judge Parker).
170. Bush's three predecessors relied upon the elevation of district judges. See Tobias,
supra note 94, at 752; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend
in Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A6. Clinton Administration examples include
Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Fourth Circuit Judge William Traxler. See
supra notes 143, 169 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
172. Candidates have been nominated to fill all of the vacancies on the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. VACANCIES, supra note 5. For analysis of Maryland, see Tobias, supra
note 38, at 110, 114; Neil Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al6.
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parties' officials there cannot agree. 173 For courts with numerous
long-term vacancies and enormous caseloads, which are situated in
states where those who proffer or can block designees are
deadlocked, Bush could consider trade-offs, such as allowing
Democratic proposals of half as many nominees as the Republicans. 174
He might even permit Democrats to suggest some candidates in
exchange for a judgeships bill, thereby inaugurating a bipartisan
judiciary, an idea that may generate much support in today's political
climate. 175 Bush could also agree with Senator Leahy on a
prearranged number of nominees to be confirmed annually. 176
If attempts at improving selection through cooperation fail, the
President might entertain and apply less conciliatory methods. For
example, Bush could use his office as a bully pulpit to blame
Democratic Senators or to cajole or shame them into greater action,
while he might force the issue by taking it to the people. Related
approaches are submission of nominees for all openings or selective
reliance on recess appointments, each of which could pressure the
Senate by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted vacancies
threaten justice. A recess appointment probably led to Judge
Gregory's confirmation, but real legal, political, and practical
restraints limit the tool's utility.177 Bush has employed, or threatened

173. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 9; Editorial, Senate Nomination Process Needs
Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 08, http://detnews.com/2002/editorial/0203/04/
a08-431361.htm {last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review),
available at 2002 WL 14869836; Editorial, The Federal Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, May 12, 2002, at G2, 2002 WL 18293981.
174. Senator Biden suggested that Republicans contemplated a similar informal
agreement, but he claimed this was not in line with the last 200 years of tradition. 143
CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 87,
(discussing Clinton's selection of federal judges and the conflict between a Republican
Senate and a Democratic executive branch). Some object to "horsetrading" over
judgeships. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 9.
175. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 271. President Eisenhower made a
similar offer in 1960. See id.; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing
judgeships bill and Judicial Conference proposals).
176. Bush might consider these ideas and should be realistic and pragmatic about
filling vacancies. Bush should calculate how critical the openings are and may conclude
that filling the bench is less important than certain principles, such as appointing the type
of judges he prefers.
177. For example, had Gregory not been confirmed, his opinions might arguably have
lacked effect. The Second and Ninth Circuits have upheld the validity of recess
appointments. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 715 (2d Cir. 1962); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess
Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional
Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV.1758 (1984).
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to employ, these measures as leverage over the Democratic Senate. 178
Nonetheless, he has invoked the techniques in a gingerly manner and
has expressed concern about maintaining a dignified process. 179
Some of these measures apply to the Fourth Circuit as a general
matter and to North Carolina specifically. For instance, consultation
is a cost-free device that Bush should deploy. Insofar as the failure to
do so prevented nomination of a lawyer for the "Maryland seat," he
might broach future designees with the state's Senators.180 The
President should similarly consult with the Senators from North
Carolina when considering the second vacancy there. However, the
political reality that none of the nominees, who are currently
proposed will be confirmed in 2002, suggests awaiting the outcomes
of the November elections.181 To the extent that Bush nominated
Chief Judge Boyle at Senator Helms's request, the Senator's
retirement may alleviate some pressure to force the confirmation
issue. 182
C.

The Senate

All Senators should assess and institute cooperative actions
because they may be as responsible as Presidents Clinton and Bush
for the current situation. Republican Senators might remember that
the Democratic Senate did confirm more judges, regardless of how
politicized the process was, when Republicans were Presidents. 183
Democrats should keep in mind that the party may lose the Senate,
the roles could again be reversed, and the public might blame them
for delayed federal justice created by unfilled openings.184
Therefore, Democratic Senators should also employ conciliatory
approaches. They should generally be receptive to administration
overtures, through responsive consultation, which affords frank
candidate evaluations and prompt approval of any district judges
178. See, e.g., supra note 95.
179. See PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for His
Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A29; see also supra note 95 (sharing
Bush's tone in treating judicial confirmations).
180. See supra note 172.
181. Bush could be criticized because he nominated no one for the second vacancy. In
fairness, Bush might have been waiting for the Senate to process other appellate nominees
or Judge Boyle before proceeding.
182. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Bush may press for approval apart
from Helms so as not to appear weak.
183. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Hartley & Holmes, supra note
36.
184. See supra note 95.
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named by Clinton whom Bush might nominate for appeals courts.
Specific cooperative possibilities abound. For example, when
Democratic Senators are dissatisfied with Republican designees, they
might propose more acceptable compromise candidates.185
Insofar as the number of unfilled vacancies derived from slowed
confirmation, Democratic leaders and Senators should apply
measures that will facilitate the approval of more judges. For
example, the Judiciary Committee could hold hearings and permit
votes on additional nominees with truncated review and even
abrogate ceremonial hearings for non-controversial candidates. To
the extent that Senator Leahy has delayed specific designees'
processing because their perceived political views are deemed
unpalatable, venerable traditions and recent practice may suggest that
nominees should receive hearings and Judiciary Committee votes. 186
The Senate Majority Leader should institute actions that will expedite
full Senate consideration. Senator Daschle may want to permit votes
on additional nominees by scheduling floor votes more promptly after
notification of Judiciary Committee approval and by providing for
increased floor debate and final votes. 187
All Senators should precisely balance the need for scrutiny with
that for speed and approve nominees with the abilities and character
to be fine judges. Democrats might carefully evaluate whether they
assign ideology too much import, just as Republicans should abandon
the quixotic quest to predict whether nominees would be "activist
judges."188 The Article II provision for advice and consent envisions
that Senators will assess professional attributes and character to
185. Illustrative are 1997 efforts at consensus of Washington Senators Slade Gorton
(R) and Patty Murray (D). See Callaghan, supra note 87; see also supra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text. Leahy should reconcile discord over processes and candidates and
mediate intractable disputes, perhaps with the aid of Senators Hatch or Lott.
186. See supra notes 94, 108 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 79--84 and
accompanying text. The party-line committee vote against Judge Pickering may be a
"payback" for sinillar Republican actions. See supra note 95. Now that Leahy has
sufficient, acceptable names to facilitate processing, Democrats might limit criticism of
Bush.
187. The debate preceding approval of Circuit Judges Merrick Garland, Marsha
Berzon, and William Fletcher arguably engendered some candid, healthy exchange. See
143 CONG. REC. S2515-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (Garland); 144 CONG. REC. Sl1872
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Berzon and Fletcher); see also Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays,
Senate Confirms 2 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A16 (discussing the
Ninth Circuit confirmation of Richard A Paez and Marsha L. Berzon, including the
difficulties involved in the confirmation process).
188. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcomm. on
Admin. Oversight and the Courts on Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations
2001, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 431 (2002); supra note 77.
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ascertain nominee skill, honesty, and appreciation and respect for
separated powers. However, Senators should not delay processing to
discern how a lawyer, once confirmed, might decide specific cases as
this could threaten judicial independence.189
Democratic Senators should consider voting for nominees who
exhibit the capacity and character to render excellent service, as
Republican Senators often did when they had a Senate majority and
In fairness, certain
Democrats controlled the presidency.190
Democratic Senators seemingly resent Republican efforts to stall
Clinton nominees, just as some Republican members apparently
continue to resent the 1987 Senate rejection of Judge Bork and the
acrimonious confirmation battle involving Justice Clarence Thomas,
which are primarily ascribed to concerns about their future
substantive decision making. 191
A few of these concepts pertain to the Fourth Circuit, in general,
and North Carolina, specifically. Senator Helms's retirement should
enable Senator Edwards to forge new links with whoever secures the
North Carolina Senate seat in November. 192 It may even be possible
to address the situation that has prevented Republican Presidents
from appointing a Fourth Circuit judge from North Carolina for eight
decades and which thwarted Senate consideration of three Clinton

189. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich et al., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE POLITICS AND
AMERICA'S COURTS: THE REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CmZENS FOR
INDEPENDENT COURTS, 1-75, 121-71, 205-42 (2000) (discussing judicial selection, the
distinction between intimidation and legitimate criticism of judges, and the role of the
legislature in establishing the power and jurisdiction of the courts); Judicial Independence
and Accountability Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315-810 (1999) (exploring the
distinction between independence of judges and accountability of the judiciary in general).
190. See supra note 99.
191. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 256 (discussing the controversy
surrounding the Bork and Thomas hearings); Melone, supra note 17, at 68 (detailing the
arguments of Senators opposed to the manner in which the Bork hearings were
conducted); Gest & Lord, supra note 102 (exploring the power struggle between
Democrats and Republicans over judicial appointments). See generally GITENSTEIN,
supra note 38 (discussing the rejection of Judge Bork); SENATOR PAUL SIMON, ADVISE &
CONSENT 73-135 (1992) (discussing the Thomas confirmation battle). The Democratic
opposition to President Bush's nominees can, perhaps, be distinguished by the enormous
significance of Supreme Court appointments and the relatively limited Democratic
scrutiny of, and resistance to, previous Republican lower court nominees. See 143 CONG.
REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997) (statements of Sen. Biden & Sen. Sarbanes).
192. See generally Richard L. Berke, Echoes Aside, Dole Insists She Is No Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at A17 (discussing Senator Helms's plan to retire); Kevin Sack, The
Jockeying Starts As Helms Yields to Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at A16 (same);
Richard Simon & Greg Miller, Helms Expected to Retire At End of Term, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2001, at Al (same).
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nominees. 193
For instance, Senator Edwards might consider
permitting the Senate to process Chief Judge Boyle's nomination, if
President Bush proposes one of the individuals suggested by
President Clinton.194
D.

The Judicial Branch

Federal judges are considerably less able than the President and
the Senate to effect constructive change because the Constitution
delegates principal responsibility to the political branches.195
Nevertheless, the judiciary might enhance attempts to publicize
vacancies and the serious problems that they impose196 and suggest
promising methods to facilitate selection that President Bush and the
Senate could effectuate.
Some ideas above apply to the Fourth Circuit. For example,
Chief Judge Wilkinson has asserted that the court operates effectively
absent a full judicial complement and does not need additional
judgeships.197 A majority of active tribunal members recently asked
Congress to approve no new Fourth Circuit positions,198 even as the
court's judges affirmatively responded in the highest percentages to
the Commission survey question whether expanding the tribunal
would help it "correct prejudicial errors, minimize appellate litigation
costs, avoid creating intercircuit [and intracircuit conflicts and] hear
oral arguments." 199 With all due respect, the percentages of written
opinions and arguments that the Fourth Circuit affords suggest that
the court might dispense more appellate justice or at least function
193. See supra notes 125, 137-140 and accompanying text.
194. Edwards reportedly opposed, but delayed blocking, Boyle's appointment until he
could discuss Judge Wynn's possible nomination with President Bush. See Matthew
Cooper & Douglas Waller, Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, TIME, May 21,
2001, at 22; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text (assessing a similar situation in
Michigan). But see supra note 174 (proposing a similar tradeoff but admonishing that
some object to "horsetrading").
195. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
196. This would increase public awareness of the problem of judicial vacancies and
perhaps heighten executive and legislative branch officials' sensitivity to the need for
expedition.
197. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
198. See Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1; Tobias, supra note 94, at
749.
199. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 149, at 18-19. The conservative estimates of
dockets, workloads and resources on which the Judicial Conference bases judgeship
proposals for Congress may also suggest the court needs new seats. See Tobias, supra note
94, at 753. But see CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 109, at 2-7 (discussing the formula
used to calculate judgeship needs); Wilkinson, supra note 111, at 1161-63 (suggesting that
increasing the number of judges will not benefit the judiciary).
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better were every authorized position occupied.200 Therefore, the
Chief Judge and his colleagues may want to reconsider whether the
Fourth Circuit would function more effectively with a full contingent
or even additional judges.201
CONCLUSION

Judicial vacancies significantly threaten the federal justice
system. The problem consists of two major components. The first,
the vacancies conundrum, is a persistent difficulty. Much delay that
accompanies it is inherent and resists change, although some
unwarranted delay can be remedied or ameliorated. The second is a
current dilemma that is essentially political and which public officials
could rectify if they muster the requisite political will. President Bush
and the Senate must eliminate unnecessary delay. They should also
attempt to depoliticize selection, stop criticizing one another,
reconcile their partisan differences, and break the present impasse for
the good of the judiciary and the nation. Senators Daschle, Leahy,
Lott, and Hatch, as well as Attorney General John Ashcroft and
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, may want to lead this effort.
Senators who represent states located in the Fourth Circuit
should cooperate as closely as possible within particular jurisdictions,
among themselves, and with the White House. The November
election of a new Senate member from North Carolina should
provide the opportunity for a fresh start and possibly greater
cooperation between the state's Senators. If the North Carolina
members consult the suggestions above, they should be able to
improve federal judicial selection in their jurisdiction, the Fourth
Circuit, and perhaps the nation.

200. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
201. These are disputed, unresolved issues. See supra notes 139, 145-53 and
accompanying text.

